Abstract
Introduction
No company can successfully compete in the digital age without a working digital platform -the infrastructural technologies, software applications and data that allow companies to sell products online, to automate internal processes, to analyze vast amounts of information to make better decisions and, increasingly, to build smart, connected products [23, 17] . These platforms are viewed as the "digital foundation" of companies and have been defined as "the IT infrastructure and digitized business processes automating a company's core capabilities." [19] .
However, for many large companies, their current platforms are more of a liability than a strategic asset. Over time, "legacy" systems have grown so complex that they stifle companies by making it difficult for employees to get things done, by making it cumbersome for customers to deal with the company, and by forcing managers into 'flying without instruments' when it comes to steering parts of their companies [15, 3 p. 13] . The inability to view a customer's transaction history across different business units or having to manually reconcile information about customers from different databases are common examples of negative impacts of platform complexity. As platform complexity eventually results in lost revenue or higher costs, companies fight it [3] .
Referring to "IT or enterprise architecture complexity," researchers have proposed several metrics for platform complexity including the size, diversity, integration and rate of change of IT artifacts on various architectural levels like IT infrastructure, applications, and information [1, 20, 8, 21] .
In reaction to growing complexity, many companies initiate IT complexity reduction programs [3] addressing one or multiple of these platform complexity metrics. For example, Akzo Nobel is moving from over 180 different ERP systems to only six [7] . Some even attempt to replace existing platforms with new, "green field" platforms: Philips is replacing its 10,000 systems with a few hundred that form their Philips Integrated Landscape [14] .
Even if they succeed, many of these IT complexity reduction initiatives often only provide temporary relief. A few years later, after the introduction of new products, geographic growth, the addition of new channels, most companies find themselves dealing with a platform that is just as complex as it was before the simplification initiative. But as we are experiencing a more and more digital economy, complex digital platforms are becoming even more of a liability as companies increasingly start to expose their platforms via APIs to external parties [22] and platforms start featuring as core enablers of smart, connected products directly used by customers [23, 17, 16] .
But how can executives avoid building the next complex legacy platform when taking their companies into the digital age? Based on in-depth case studies, research interviews with executives from other 5450 Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41821 ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2 CC-BY-NC-ND companies, and the experience -even if not systematically analyzed -of more than 100 consulting projects in the area of IT complexity over the last five years, this paper identifies three drivers that lead companies to accumulate complexity in their digital platforms. The paper also proposes how companies can address these three drivers in order to avoid building the next legacy platform of the future.
About the research
To answer our research question ("how can companies avoid building the next complex legacy platform?") we followed a case-based approach. We interviewed 35 IT and business executives on their challenges on complexity and how they addressed them in an exploratory fashion. These interviews confirmed the relevance of the issue and provided a basis for selecting case studies. We conducted several in-depth case studies for selected companies, out of which we refer to four in detail in this article. In these companies, we interviewed a total of 43 (ING Direct Spain: 3, DHL Express: 7, USAA: 17, Royal Philips: 16) employees from IT and non-IT parts ranging from C-level to project management level. We selected the companies as they addressed IT platform complexity challenges in convincing ways and stood out compared to the other companies we had interviewed. They either went through situations of growth or change on the business side (ING Direct Spain, USAA) that often lead to excessively complex IT platforms, but didn't in these cases; or they had highly complex platforms and employed measures to avoid this from happening in the future (Philips, DHL Express).
One author and another researcher wrote up individual case studies [11, 10, 13, 14] based on transcribed interview data. The two authors of this article then analyzed them for commonalities across cases (see Table 1 ). The coding categories were based on concepts we derived from game-theoretic works [2, 4, 5, 6] : information asymmetries, incentives, and power differentials. Game theory has most often been used to explain strategic moves on an inter-company level where there is incomplete or asymmetrical information. But it can be applied equally to decisions within the corporate environment, like the decisions of whether and how to deploy new technology [4] . A key insight derived from game theory addresses how decentralized teams (like IT and non-IT groups) deal with proprietary information and bargain with each other to reach agreements [2, p. 804] . When those teams don't have equal access to the available information, the solutions (or the platform in our case) they arrive at will be inefficient. If each bargainer knows something relevant that the other does not, such as the payoff from a successful agreement, bargains that should ideally be struck are likely to be delayed or rejected [5, p. 115] .
Power differentials serve to rig the bargaining system in favor of the more powerful or knowledgeable party -in this case perhaps business units (BU) over central IT. And this power differential has significant implications: while one party (i.e., central IT) has the fuller picture, it may lack the power to insinuate that view into the more powerful party's (i.e., the BU's) decision-making [4, p. 50] . Applying game theory helps us redefine the problem of platform complexity as an organizational, behavioral and management issue, rather than a technical problem.
After the cross-case analysis, we went back to previous single company interviews [9] and existing case studies on other companies [12, 18] that were not primarily on complexity but covered the topic at least in some depth. We did this to identify examples that further illustrated or countered our findings, and also to extend the range of industries covered. These are included in the last column in Table 1 .
Description of the case companies
Below we introduce the companies and explain why we selected them for this research.
Royal Philips
Royal Philips was founded in 1891 in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. In 2013, Royal Philips operated in 15 Business Groups comprising over 60 Business Categories. Each Business Group belonged to one of three Sectors: Lighting (e.g., city street lighting, automotive lighting, consumer luminaires, etc.), Healthcare (imaging systems, integrated healthcare solutions, healthcare software, etc.) and Consumer Lifestyle (e.g. personal care, household products, computer accessories, etc.). With these products, Philips served customers in over 100 countries clustered into 17 markets (North America, China, etc.).
Throughout its history, Philips' products have been widely respected. In 2013, Philips was the most valuable brand in The Netherlands, with Interbrand ranking it 40th among the 100 most valuable brands globally. Despite its brand and innovations, Philips' financial performance was flagging early in the new millennium. From 2000-2010, Philips lost more than 40% of its revenue and its profit margin had dropped from 25% to 7% after losses in several years.
On April 1, 2011, Frans van Houten was named CEO and tasked with turning around the business with the Accelerate! transformation. Financially, the transformation promised EBITA margins of 11-12% by the end of 2016 and 10-12% by the end of 2013 while growing sales at a CAGR of 4-6% between 2014 and 2016. All mid-term goals for 2013 were reached and shareholder's confidence as its share price had doubled since its most recent low point in late 2011.
One of the key challenges the transformation was facing was the large degree of freedom previously granted to P&L responsible product managers. This led to a proliferation of non-standardized business processes supported by more than 10,000 applications. For example, Philips was running a total of around 60 different ERP systems. No wonder Philips found that within one sector, it had 17 different ways of sending invoices to customers [14] which proved both costly for Philips and cumbersome for customers. In response, Philips' new CIO designed a new "green field" IT landscape for all of Philips: the so called Philips Integrated Landscape (PIL) that supported three newly defined globally standardized processes: idea-tomarket (concerned with turning an idea into a product, service, software or system, bringing it to the market and managing the product lifecycle), market-to-order (concerned with marketing the product and generating sales orders), and order-to-cash (concerned with the processing of an order including, for example, fulfillment, distribution, invoicing, payments handling). Philips is an example of a company that then also had to employ measures to avoid creating the next legacy platform despite the targeted growth [14] .
USAA
Founded in 1922, Texas-based financial service provider USAA has grown its product portfolio from auto insurance to over 100 P&C and life insurance, banking, and investment management products.
More recently, USAA has also created connections between different products by linking them in integrated services addressing life events. Life events like buying a car or house-or getting marriedinvolve multiple products such as loans and insurance. Introduced in 2010, one of the company's first integrated services targeted the car buying life event, allowing members to select, buy (at a pre-negotiated price), finance, and insure a car in one seamless process. While this made its members' (this is how USAA calls its customers), lives easier, the need to integrate can easily create a "spaghetti"-type platform.
Instead, USAA leveraged a single "customer information file" to provide a 360 degree view of the customer across products. USAA had managed to maintain a manageable platform since its development in 1984. Also, USAA invested less than half its IT budget in running systems. In 2012, average project delivery time was 125 days, which was significantly below industry average and a reduction of more than 50 days from 2009. Ninety-three percent of projects were delivered on time, and in 2012 USAA was concurrently working on nearly 250 projects. By 2012, 50% of the functionality in new systems was reused from existing components. In 2011, USAA's 23,400 employees generated revenues of $19 billion, an increase of 6.7% over 2010. Its net profit margin of 11.2% compared to an industry average of 2.2%. Its 8.8 million members in 2011 constituted a 10% increase over 2010 with a 98% retention rate. USAA had long focused on providing an excellent customer experience. Its success in this regard was reflected in its Net Promoter Scores (NPS): in the 2011 Satmetrix Net Promoter Benchmark Study of US Consumers, USAA led in the Auto Insurance, Banking and Homeowners Insurance industries with scores that were at least double the industry average scores [10] . ING Direct Spain is an example of a company that showed strong growth, while keeping its IT platform's complexity at bay. Originally started as a mono-line business focused purely on savings accounts, over time ING Direct Spain had become a full-service bank. To achieve that goal, the direct bank had substantially increased its portfolio of products (including loans, credit cards, mortgages, life insurance, brokerage services, etc.) and channels (including the phone, the web, mobile apps, and even 30 branches). The increased variety in the product portfolio was viewed as creating value for ING Direct Spain: In 2011, ING Direct Spain reported 77 million EUR in profits before tax (a 9-year CAGR of 28%) and 2.41 million customers (a 9-year CAGR of 16%), of which more than 700,000 used ING Direct Spain as their main bank. Citing the Association of Spanish Banks, ING Direct Spain took pride in being the "leading direct bank in Spain," with managed funds that totaled 29.9 million EUR and 940 employees.
ING Direct Spain
At the same time, operating fixed-cost per customers had grown by only 20% since 2005. An IT cost benchmark performed by an independent consulting firm revealed ING Direct to be best-in-class in the Spanish market. Its cost per account had dropped by 25% between 2008 and 2011. Also in terms of total operations cost per account, ING Direct Spain continued to be very efficient. One benchmark compared ING Direct Spain's costs per account to ten Eastern & Central European banks that were deemed comparable in terms of scale. ING Direct Spain's costs per account were somewhat below the average of the top three banks in the sample which was less than half of the cost of the average performers in the sample and a third of the average Iberian bank [11] .
DHL Express
In 2012, DHL Express ("the most international company on earth") was one of four divisions of Deutsche Post DHL (DPDHL). DHL Express' 100,000 employees transported 1.6 million packages each day for the company's 2.6 million customers. Although all four divisions were profitable and all had revenues ranging between €13 and €16 billion, the Express division contributed more than 40% of the group's profit. DHL Express had become profitable in 2010 and enjoyed 8.7% Return on Sales in 2012.
But that hadn't always been the case. From 2004-2008, the losses in the US alone grew at an annual rate of 24%, eventually topping $1 billion. As one of the levers to turn around the business, the company had introduced a set of global business and technology standards known as Express Global Application Portfolio or EGAP. Moving the US business to the global standard meant replacing the current international shipping processes and supporting 600 systems with around EGAP processes supported by around 145 systems. Examples of the issues created by non-standardized processes and systems were that employees could not be deployed globally and information of global customers was dispersed.
But even if all regions conformed to a common standard, the challenge was an ongoing one: how to maintain a truly global standard. Especially with DHL operating in 220 countries and territories, changing regulations and pressures for modifying the global standard in order to serve local customers better came up regularly. And with 100,000 employees, ideas for improving standard practices popped-up everywhere.
We selected the DHL Express case for this research as the company developed mechanisms to deal with requests for changes to the global standard, i.e. aiming at avoiding a future increase in complexity [13] .
Findings: 3 drivers of platform complexity and how to counter them
Our case companies employed technical and nontechnical practices to address platform complexity for the long term. The technical practices aimed for "smart design" of their IT platforms (e.g., designing for reuse, for decoupling, for configuration instead of customization). The idea underlying these practices is that following certain design principles will lead to IT platforms that will be less complex and that will be able to "absorb" complexity caused by increasing and changing business requirements.
We built [ We identified three non-technical drivers that cause companies to incur complexity in their IT platformsnone of which have to do with the technology itself, but rather with those who create and manage the complexity and their decision making, i.e, people and their behavior (see Table 1 ).
Lack of awareness of the consequences business decisions have on platform complexity
Customer service employees dealing with customers who have to log in multiple times to access different products, operational-level employees having to enter the same data multiple times, IT people having to maintain hundreds of intertwined IT systems -they all experience the impact of platform complexity every day. And they can predict the consequences of introducing yet another product modification, or of opening the new mobile channel on IT complexity pretty well. Product managers, who are adding "only one more product" cannot. This mismatch between those creating complexity (with the best intentions) and those having to deal with it is a source of complexity.
When Large commercial insurers in the US have built up a repository of 30,000+ products as a result of not having a feedback loop about the resulting burden on the organization (underwriters, operations, customer service, IT, regulatory services, etc.).
Looking at companies that have worked hard on avoiding excessive platform complexity, one way to counter this is to create transparency by removing information asymmetries between those creating complexity and those having to deal with complexity. The following examples highlight potential actions:
• The CIO in one global pharma company developed a mobile app to show the number of applications per business unit, per business processes and sub-processes. When being asked by his peers from finance, HR, or sales to build a new system, he pulled out his iPad, launched the app and asked "Can't any of your 80 systems do that for you?" Providing this feedback made business executives aware of the complexity their previous demands had created and started a healthy discussion about re-using existing systems and working on simplification together rather than making it an IT issue. Within three years, the company moved from 4100 to 3000 applications. 
Lack of motivation to avoid complexity in digital platforms
In most companies we studied, the people with revenue or profit and loss responsibility had the power to make things happen, mostly in favor of what is best for their own local unit.
" ' " Take all these locally optimal actions together that each add just one more non-standard database system, or deviate in just one more way from the global standard, and you necessarily end up with a complex digital platform.
Some companies we studied reacted by redefining incentive systems to include long-term impacts on the complexity of digital platforms:
• At ING Direct Spain and USAA, corporate-wide incentives count at least as much as local unit incentives, encouraging employees to think about enterprise-wide impacts (including on IT) rather than just their local impacts. The same companies also use multiple, potentially conflicting goals to measure success and hold people accountable (like profitability and customer satisfaction -the latter one is often much more directly impacted by dysfunctional and complex IT systems).
• The improved experience from faster project delivery, lower long-term cost of re-usable platform components have instilled a "pull" from the business side instead of having IT "push" all the time: "Because of 10 years of shared experiences and shared successes, now these business people are the first ones to go, "Oh, don't shortcut, because I want it [the IT system] to be around here a long time." -Jim Kuhn, USAA • Other organizations (Fidelity Investments is one of them [18] ) have established a concept called "technology debt." The purpose is to instill some level of accountability with the non-IT side of the business when making IT-related decisions. Often times, the impact of IT-related decisions has a long latency, so the IT unit gets left with the burden of accumulating complexity over time. To offset the negative effect of increasing IT complexity, the technology debt can be a jointly agreed amount that the IT unit charges the business and that is paid off using the benefits from the IT-based solution that was put in place by the business. IT will then use this fund to unravel the complexity over time. While technology debt is seemingly reactive as it is charged ex-post, it is actually a preventive mechanism. As the business starts feeling the weight of the debt, over time, they become more conscious in making certain technology trade-offs.
Lack of authority to effectively protect digital platforms from complexity
More often than not, the IT unit is seen as an "order taker" rather than a thought partner. As a consequence, even those standards and policies set up by the IT unit to fight complexity are circumvented with exceptions or ignored altogether. But because the IT unit is one of those units that feel the impact of complexity every day, it can provide valuable input into decision making -if they are allowed to and have "a seat at the decision making table." Some companies are hence removing the power imbalance between those who create complexity and those having to manage it (like IT):
• The CEO of Bayer Material Science empowered the CIO to reduce the variety of ERP systems around the globe as part of their "Program One" by "reversing the burden of proof": instead of having IT argue with every country manager on whether they could adapt to the global company standard, by default country managers had to adopt the new global standard, unless they could prove that deviating from the standard had more benefits for the company as a whole than not doing so. [12] . At Philips, as well as at IBM, business units need to prove a "customer's willingness to pay" for the benefits that cause added complexity or legal requirements before they are allowed to deviate from the global standard: " 
Guidelines for practitioners
Probably the most common way of dealing with IT platform complexity we've found is by addressing it on a technical level through the likes of serverconsolidation and application rationalization. But such complexity reduction happens 'after the fact' and often turns into a never-ending task as complexity seeps in with ever-increasing and -changing business demands.
To address platform complexity more sustainably, a technical, "reduce complexity after the fact" approach needs to be complemented with one that influences behavior and seeks to curb complexity before it is created. To do so, executives might want to consider the three levers we identified (see Table 1 ): 1) Address unawareness of the consequences business decisions have on the complexity of digital platforms. Executives need to create transparency by removing information asymmetries between those creating platform complexity and those having to deal with platform complexity. This is best done by bringing those two groups of people together. Hence, most of the practices in Table 1 support creating a common understanding by bringing together cross-functional teams including IT, product management, customer service etc. The call for creating transparency isn't new: a lot of research on IT platform complexity has so far focused on transparency by trying to come up with extensive metrics for architecture complexity and its drivers [1, 20, 8, 21] . Our research supports that creating transparency of complexity is a key lever to managing it. But it is only one lever. And beyond metrics, decision-makers also need to understand the implication of decisions on those metrics. 2) Create a compelling motivation for avoiding platform complexity. Companies can do so by setting incentives (or penalties) that consider platform complexity. A focus on individual business cases and short-term departmental or business-unit performance encourages local optimization that often increases enterprise-wide platform complexity. In contrast, the case companies encourage enterprise-wide thinking: by adapting their bonus and performance evaluation systems, having executives model behavior supporting enterprise-optimized decisions, as well as setting policies that avoid local benefits while risking a more complex platform for everyone. 3) Redress the power imbalance between those creating and those having to deal with complexity. Even with cross-functional teams, if e.g., country managers always get their way with using e.g., nonstandard systems, little will change in terms of platform complexity. Hence, our case companies also created and empowered roles charged with protecting platforms from complexity (e.g., the IT unit, process owners, etc.). Besides being part of the operational-level cross-functional teams, the respective roles were also included in executivelevel decision-making committees. And policies such as "reversing the burden of proof" help turn an "upward-battle" against complexity into a situation where people have to argue if they want to increase complexity -effectively granting more power to those having to deal with complexity.
Managing platform complexity in the long run is about changing behavior. (This is true even when companies outsource platforms or use cloud-based platforms: for example, without the appropriate incentive systems to drive desired behavior in an outsourcing relationship, handing over a complex platform will not help. And while software-as-a-service platforms can help to limit excessive customization and variety within one system, they don't address proliferation in the number of systems unless behavioral changes happen in parallel.)
Companies that go beyond technical approaches to complexity management and beyond reducing complexity in their platforms 'after the fact' -by pulling on the three identified people-and behaviorrelated levers -will find themselves better positioned to compete in the digital age and avoid turning their digital investment into their legacy headache of the future. We hope that the cases highlighted here inspire executives to adopt policies and practices to complement their IT complexity reduction efforts. And we hope that research on IT complexity will focus even more on these behavioral drivers of IT complexity. 
